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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

CD NO.

COUNTRY Germany (Russian Zone)/Eastern Approaches

DATE DISTR. 16 October 1951

SUBJECT Transportation Estimate of the Rail  
System in Eastern Europe

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PLACE  
ACQUIRED [REDACTED]

NO. OF ENCLS. 2 Annexes  
(LISTED BELOW) 1 report (4 pages)

DATE OF  
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SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.

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1. East-West railroad lines which the Soviet are most likely to use in all-out offensive against Western Europe are shown in Annex 1. An overlay showing alternate lines outside the Soviet Zone of Germany is attached as Annex 2. A comparatively dense railroad system for cross connections and/or rerouting is available in the Soviet Zone of Germany. It was shown in the railroad map which was submitted with a previous report.
2. Most of the lines selected are double-track or single-track lines which, because of their structural and operational facilities, allow a high standard of performance. The Germans were able to maintain a high traffic density over these lines during World War II. The trackage of the lines is indicated in the Annexes.
3. It is believed that because of their capacity and accessibility from the U.S.S.R., lines 1 through 6 will be used for major operations. Line 5 is not yet open for through traffic because the Meisse River bridge near Goerlitz is still destroyed. However, the reconstruction of this bridge is planned for 1951.

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The lines 7 and 8a from Galicia and lines 8b and 8c from Rumania have a limited capacity and, therefore, are believed to serve only as alternate lines to transport Soviet units stationed in these areas.


4. The lines selected in Annex 2 would enable the Soviets to reroute trains to other lines, if necessary for strategic reasons or in the event of breakdowns on the lines. A sufficient number of lines for rerouting over short distances, which may become necessary for operational reasons or because of enemy action, is available in the Soviet Zone of Germany. For example, a new by-pass to the north via Wuhlheide-Karow-Marzahn-Oranienburg, which has already been finished and another one to the south via Wuhlheide-Gruenau-Mahlow-Grossbeeren, which is under construction and will probably be completed by 1 August 1951 were constructed for the use of the railroad junction of Berlin. These by-passes will facilitate the operations of the Berlin junction and diminish its vulnerability from enemy air action and/or disturbances in the West Sectors.
5. The capacity of the lines indicated in Annexes 1 and 2 represents an average which may be reached and maintained over a period of several weeks. The theoretical capacity is higher than the actual capacity, because in addition to the military traffic, the lines will also have to handle: the railroad operational traffic, i.e., empty rolling stock, trains for the coal supply, empty locomotives, etc; the economic freight traffic for industry, agriculture, and supply of the civilian population; and civilian and army personnel traffic, although this will be limited. It is possible to restrict the other categories of traffic and thus increase the volume of the military traffic for a short period of time. However, this will only be possible under exceptional circumstances for only short periods. During the massing of troops against the U.S.S.R. in World War II, the Germans maintained a traffic density of 48 trains daily on lines 1 through 6 for about six weeks. This, however, necessitated restrictions on the economic and civilian traffic which could not have been maintained over a prolonged period of time.

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
6. A train weight of 1,200 metric tons was previously fixed as the maximum for transit traffic through Poland, but, effective 1 May 1951, it was increased to 1,500 metric tons. This would mean a load capacity of approximately 1,000 tons per train. It cannot be predicted whether it will be possible to maintain this capacity on all lines and trains in the event of war. The Germans maintained an average load capacity of 500 to 700 tons for military trains during World War II.
7. The bottleneck for all westbound rail movements from the U.S.S.R. is the point where the change from broad gauge to normal gauge and vice versa is effected. The daily transfer capacity of these points on the western border of the U.S.S.R. now amounts to a total of 32 trains. Even if they are not now utilized to maximum capacity and even if their capacity could be approximately doubled in the event of war, as is believed possible, they would still be able to supply the lines they serve with only a fraction of their capacity. This bottleneck could of course be avoided in the case of troop movements by detraining units on Soviet territory, marching them to Polish territory and loading them there on normal-gauge trains. However, it is not possible to transfer supply and economic shipments except at rail change-over points because other railroad stations do not have loading facilities and ramps.
8. The estimate of daily traffic capacity<sup>4</sup> summarized as follows: 48 trains on line 1, 48 trains on line 2, 60 trains on line 3, 48 trains on line 4, 48 trains on line 5 ( see paragraph 5), and 36 trains on line 6, or an estimated total of 288 trains across Poland; and 36 trains on line 7, and 48 trains on line 8, or a possible total of 84 trains across Czechoslovakia and Austria. This would result in a total of 372 trains. The locomotives and normal-gauge cars required for this volume of traffic could be furnished from available locomotive and car parks of the countries in the Soviet orbit. In this connection, it should be remembered that, for example, the sides of the gondola cars, which

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make up the bulk of the rolling stock, would have to be removed so that vehicles could be loaded, and this would require time. Another delaying factor might be the insufficient number of heavy duty cars for heavy tanks and tank cars for fuel shipments. A prolonged commitment of this rolling stock to military purposes would probably have detrimental effects upon the economy.




2 Annexes! Two overlays.

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# **Selected East-West Railroad Lines with Lateral Connections** Overlay to Map: Germany and its Approaches

Scale 1:1,500,000



# Selected East - West Railroad Lines

Overlay to Map: Germany and its Approaches

Scale 1:1,500,000

